We investigate whether information from credit default swap spreads (CDS) is useful for assessing the default risk of large banks. Based on an international sample from the period [2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008], we analyze and compare individual banks' daily senior and subordinate CDS spreads with stock market, credit rating, and accounting information. We find that differences and ratios of matched CDS spreads with different rankings are informative about banks' default risk. In normal times, both CDS market segments contribute significantly to price discovery but trading in subordinate CDS is less expensive. During the crisis (after August 2007), both segments exhibit a higher liquidity than before. However, information is now reflected earlier in senior than in subordinate CDS spreads, indicating a flight-to-quality. Our results highlight that information from CDS markets is useful beyond banks' share prices and credit ratings and, thus, improves market discipline through market monitoring. 
Extended Abstract
Default risk of banks is a hot topic. Currently, governments, central banks, and bank supervisors struggle whether and how to rescue individual banks, how to restore financial stability, and how to reshape the global financial system. Policy implications of research on financial intermediation and financial stability are needed more than ever. In this paper, we investigate whether joint information from credit default swaps (CDS) spreads with different rankings is useful for assessing the default risk of large banks, which can enhance market discipline. Market-based risk indicators may represent a complementary source of real-time information on banks' default risk, i.e., create market monitoring, and may improve the incentive structure for banks through feedback effects, i.e., exert market influence on credit availability and the cost of credit (see Flannery 1998) . Our study primarily relates to market monitoring.
Given the importance of banks, the dramatic growth of credit risk transfer, and its role during the crisis (e.g., Stulz 2009), it is surprising that there is little evidence on CDS of banks (exceptions are Eichengreen et al. 2009 , King 2009 ). Credit spreads of banks were very low before the crisis and there seemed to be no demand for a more comprehensive credit risk assessment and market discipline mechanisms beyond traditional banking supervision, credit ratings, and accounting-based disclosure requirements. The situation has changed substantially during the on-going crisis. Large credit losses, a substantial number of bank failures, the freeze up of interbank markets, and the negative impact on the real economy are examples for the consequences of realized default risk of banks. Counterparty risk in interbank and OTC derivatives markets is now a key issue since credit spreads of many banks have widened dramatically. Therefore, we take a comprehensive look at how default risk of banks is reflected in CDS markets. We exploit a unique characteristic of these markets: CDS traders frequently provide simultaneous quotes for contracts on senior and subordinate bank debt. The main reason for this simultaneous quotation is that, unlike industrial firms, banks make frequent and substantial use of subordinate notes and debentures (SND) since these instruments are recognized as a part of their regulatory capital. Therefore, the subordinate segment of CDS markets attracts a large share of the overall trading volume in CDS on banks. Moreover, previous studies document that CDS markets are in general more sensitive to credit-related information than other markets, in particular compared to bond markets and when credit conditions deteriorate. Furthermore, in contrast to stock markets, CDS markets are made up by institutional traders only and there has been little supervision and regulation.
In our study, we both consider the difference and the ratio of subordinate and senior CDS spreads as well as both CDS spreads separately. Several remarks are in order. Considering the combined information from senior and subordinate CDS spreads can be superior to considering one type of debt only because the information processing might differ across segments. Moreover, spreads of subordinate debt, often labeled hybrid capital, are more risksensitive because of the absolute priority rule in debt service. The recovery rate of subordinate debt is always lower than the one of senior debt. Note that the probability of default is the same of both types of debt since it is measured at the issuer level and not at the level of single securities. In that respect, subordinate debt resembles equity although it is a debt claim.
Looking at the difference (and ratio) between credit spreads of debt instruments with different ranks makes it possible to control for time-varying risk premia and liquidity effects. It is analogous to looking at the difference between credit spreads of differently-rated debt (e.g., credit spreads on BBB minus AAA bonds) instead of looking at one spread only. We also consider the ratio to measure the importance of the spreads relative to the levels. This is important because the dynamics of the difference and ratio may have different interpretations, conditional on which spread has changed more strongly. Note that we control for the fact that both measures are influenced by a bank's capital structure, i.e., the fraction of subordinate debt relative to senior debt. The ratio of CDS spreads measures the relation of the marketimplied recovery rates on subordinate and senior debt while the difference measures the product of the probability of default times the difference in recovery rates. We base our study on an international sample of large banks from the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] and examine whether individual banks' daily senior and subordinate CDS spreads compared to stock market, credit rating, and accounting information (see Table 1 ). We provide evidence that differences and ratios of matched CDS spreads with different rankings are informative about banks' default risk compared to other sources of information (see Figure 1) . It can be seen that there is substantially more variation and a different pattern in our measures of CDS market information than in banks' share prices, especially during the crisis. For example, the strong reversal in CDS spreads on European banks in September 2008, i.e., the sharp decreases in the difference and ratio of subordinate and senior CDS spreads are due to the announcement of bank rescue plans by several governments whereas stock markets continue to fall (see King, 2009 ). Moreover, we show that subordinate CDS spreads are more closely related to share prices than senior CDS spreads (see Table 2 ). In addition, we observe that both types of CDS spreads become more sensitive to stock market information during the crisis (Table 2, Panel B).
We also find that CDS trading in the subordinate segment is less expensive in normal times (see Figure 2) , which is consistent with the importance of subordinate debt for bank capital. Interestingly, both CDS market segments are more liquid after August 2007. This finding is complementary to the results by Alexopoulou, Andersson and Georgescu (2009) who show that CDS markets contribute more to price discovery during the crisis than bond markets. However, the CDS market structure has shifted towards the senior segment, indicating a flight-to-quality. Our time-series analysis reveals two-way linkages and a longrun equilibrium between senior and subordinate CDS spreads before the crisis. However, during the crisis, the long-run equilibrium breaks down and there is a clear lead of the senior over the subordinate CDS spreads during the crisis (see Table 3 ). This change in information processing is supported with an increased liquidity of the senior CDS segment during the crisis.
Finally, we analyze the determinants of the difference and ratio of matched subordinate and senior CDS spreads on banks (see Table 4 ). Most important, we find that the difference of the percentage bid-ask spread between subordinate and senior CDS is significantly negatively related to the difference and ratio. In other words, the bigger the difference in trading costs and liquidity, the closer the two CDS spreads. The magnitude of this effect almost doubles during the crisis, indicating that liquidity is an important factor. Furthermore, the share price index SHARE is significantly related to the difference and ratio (except for the ratio during the crisis), i.e., spreads on subordinate relative to senior debt increase when share prices fall.
Note the magnitude of the link between stock and CDS markets increases by more than 30%
(from -0.1089 to -0.1443). Interestingly, the rating variables RATING, DOWN and REVDOWN are all positively related to the difference between senior and subordinate debt before the crisis since the difference reflects both the risk of default and loss severity. Hence, it is consistent to find no influence on the ratio since the probability of default is netted out in this measure. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the coefficients of RATING and DOWN loose their significance whereas the coefficient of REVDOWN more than doubles. This is in line with the rating agencies' claim that providing additional services such as rating reviews, watch listings and outlooks adds value to the credit rating itself. Finally, SUBTA, the fraction of subordinate debt to total assets is the only significant accounting measure that affects CDS spreads. Consistent with theory, it only affects the ratio but not the difference of subordinate and senior CDS spreads since the capital structure is also measured in relative terms. 
